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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

REGENCY.—On the 9th instant, Sir Francis Burdett gave notice in the House of Commons, that, after the recess, he should bring forward a motion for the introduction of a bill, the object of which should be, to provide, that the Regency should devolve on the *Princess Charlotte of Wales*, in case the Prince Regent should die while his father continued in his present state of incapacity to govern.—On this proposition, which so many circumstances concur to render proper, I should have said nothing at present, had it not been for an article, which, the day after the making of the motion, was published in the *Morning Post* news-paper. That article, however, the sentiments of which were echoed in the *Courier* of the same day, and which sentiments are obviously those which the borough-mongers would wish to inculcate, calls aloud for animadversion.—The article was as follows:—“In speaking of the tyranny of Buonaparté, we have frequently heard it advanced that a Despot could not stand still, that a rotatory motion, like that of the spheres, was necessary to keep the body politic in its orbit, and fix the prime central force in security; and we have subscribed to the doctrine, because we have seen that Buonaparté had neither the means of rest or repose within his circle of power. The same remark applied to a Despot, may be applied to a Demagogue. It is not in his power to be still; he cannot say, here I am safe, and it is needless to go further; an impulse more potent than his own propels him, and he must advance, for retreat is impossible.—Sir Francis Burdett gave a melancholy example of this in the House of Commons last night, when he gave notice of a motion (for in motion he must be) to secure the Regency of the Kingdom to the *Princess Charlotte of Wales*, in the event of the decease of the Prince Regent before the King.—It would be to abuse common sense, to offer a hint at the motives which could induce any Member of the

British Parliament to bring forward such a proposition. *Causelessly to disturb the country, needlessly to agitate the minds of men, to introduce (if possible) confusion and disunion, are so obviously its features, that while we name them, it is only to express our pity and contempt of the weakness that could think the means efficient for the purpose. We have no doubt but the propriety, the indignation of Parliament will quash so despicable an attempt in its bud. The distinguished few may make their inflammatory speeches, and endeavour to disseminate their base poisons, but the understanding of the country is too good to suffer such miserable efforts to pass without a record of abhorrence for their motives, though allied to compassion for the weakness of their force. For the present we shall not enter at large into the movement of this malignant theme;—suffice it to say, that neither the time, nor the circumstances of our situation, nor the nature of things, nor the calculation of human probability, call in the slightest degree for the discussion of this measure. For what, then, is it stirred, beyond keeping alive the name of the Pride of the Westminster Junta, who can so well appreciate the military merits of a Wellington, to try if it is within the abilities of the vilest faction that ever overstepped the license of freedom in a free country, and by their actions proved how far that which is our greatest blessing can be converted into our curse?—The subject is of too delicate a nature to admit of premature consideration; we shall content ourselves with directing the attention of the honest and the loyal part of the community to the treacherous design, and leave it to those who have more authority than ourselves to stifle it by manly resistance. The snake, scotched last session, is yet swelling with venom, and, though insignificant in itself, is yet to be guarded against, as the spreading of its venom is injurious to the wholesome body of the State.”—It is not much more than a month, since this same news-paper, follow-*

ing the Morning Chronicle, asserted, that SIR FRANCIS BURDETT had resolved never again to enter the Houses of Parliament, and never again appear at a Public dinner. The Public have already seen the proof of the falsehood of these assertions; and, they will not be long before they will see the proof of as gross falsehood in the above paragraph. Easy as it was to suppose, that these hirelings would endeavour to attribute a bad motive to any act of this most formidable enemy of the whole tribe of hirelings, it really does strike one with astonishment that any body should be at once so foolish and so wicked as the author of this paragraph appears to be.—He sets out with saying, that it would be to *abuse common sense* to offer a *hint* at the motives of Sir Francis; and, the moment he has said that, he begins distinctly to assert what those motives are; and, having thus resolved to abuse common sense, he tells us that the motives are, to disturb the country, to agitate the minds of men, and to introduce *confusion* and *disunion*!—And does the reader believe, that these effects are to be produced by a timely and dispassionate discussion of the question of who ought to be Regent, in the event of the Prince's death? Does he believe, that the country will be *disturbed*, and that *confusion* and *disunion* will arise, from a proposition to settle the Regency of the Kingdom in the person of the undoubted heiress to the Throne, especially when it is considered, that, as it is said, the young Princess is endowed with extraordinary powers of mind for her age! Does the reader discover symptoms of *disloyalty* in a proposition like this?—The hireling talks of “*inflammatory speeches*,” and “*endeavours to disseminate base poison*,” and by what means? Why, truly, by proposing, that the heiress to the throne shall come into the Regency as a matter of course, without any delays and debates, in case of her Father's death. It is very hard to see how such a proposition should give rise to “*inflammatory speeches*,” or how it should serve as the vehicle of “*base poison*.”—This writer says that the measure is unnecessary, and that it is not within the calculation of human probability that it should become necessary. So, because we cannot calculate, with any degree of precision, how long the Prince will live, we are to make no provisions for the carrying on of the government in case of his death. The same argument might be urged against any man's making a will, and surely might have been

urged against that very act of Parliament which authorized, and which still authorizes, the King to make a will. Sir Francis Burdett does not presume to say, that the Prince is going to die; he knows that the Prince may live a great number of years; but, he also knows, that he may die in a week's or a day's time; and, anxious, as he has always shewn himself to be, to secure the Crown in the enjoyment of all its just rights and prerogatives, he wishes, in case of that event, to provide against a recurrence of those interregnums which we have before seen take place. It is, besides, time that the people should begin to have their eyes fixed upon her who is to be their future Sovereign; it is time, that she should be introduced to her future people; and, therefore, it is proper that a proposition of this sort should be made and discussed.—We are told by this writer that the subject is of too *delicate* a nature to admit of premature discussion. But, in what way is it too *delicate*? I see nothing of great delicacy in it any more than in any other provision respecting a Regency. If, indeed, the Princess Charlotte were not the undoubted heiress to the Throne; if there were any other persons to dispute the title with her; if there were any apprehension of rivals of any sort; then, indeed, to agitate the question, though very necessary even in that case, might tend to create disunion; but, being, as she undoubtedly is, the only person in whose behalf, after her Father, any claim can be raised to the possession of the Throne, it is impossible, I think, for any one to believe, that disunion can be created in the country by the intended motion.—Yet has this hireling the audacity to charge Sir Francis with a “*treacherous design*,” and to call upon those “*who have more authority than himself, to stifle it by manly resistance*.” Who it is that he means here as being possessed of such authority, I cannot tell; but I am quite sure, that no such authority will be found to exist; and, indeed, it would be curious to hear any one in authority daring enough to attempt to stifle such a design. *Treacherous*, indeed! and towards whom? Towards the Crown it cannot be treacherous, because its necessary tendency is to inculcate in the minds of the people the doctrine of lineal succession. Towards the ministers and their master, it cannot be Treacherous, because it is openly avowed. It can, indeed, be Treacherous towards nobody; and it can be considered as hostile towards none but that oligarchy, whose in-

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terest it is to keep the Crown and all the members of the Royal Family as much as possible dependent upon its will. What do the people of England want but to see the succession to regal power clearly marked out? We all remember, the loud complaints, which were made only about two years ago against the ministers for having, as it was alleged, carried on the government for a considerable length of time, without any one to exercise the functions of Royalty. And, ought not provision, therefore, to be made to prevent the recurrence of that reprobated state of things? Ought not provision to be made for the preventing of a repetition of those scenes, which took place at the establishment of the present Regency? And ought an endeavour to effect such a provision to be represented as the "spreading of venom injurious to the wholesome body of the state?"—I do not say, that the discussion of this proposition may not give rise to the agitation of matters of great delicacy, deeply interesting to the Royal Parents of the Lady whose rights it is the principal object of the intended motion to secure. But, while I do not see the necessity of this; while I do not see its necessity, I am far from saying, and I am far from thinking, that such agitation would be, or could be, at all "injurious to the wholesome body of the state;" seeing that, as it appears to me, the agitation of these matters, and that, too, with unlimited freedom, must take place sooner or later. The agitation of these matters has found its way into *print*. Out of print it cannot be put; the thing must make its appearance before the world; and the sooner it does so the better; because most of the parties, concerned in the matters in question, are now living; there are now the means of clearing up every thing to the satisfaction of the people and of the world; and in a few years, those means may no longer exist. Therefore, if even this consequence were to follow from the intended motion of Sir Francis Burdett, the motion would, in my opinion, be only rendered thereby the more proper.—These observations I should have considered premature, had it not been for the publication of the article, out of which they have arisen. The subject is one of extreme importance, and, in all its stages of discussion, I shall not fail, I hope, to give to it all the attention which it merits, as well on account of the person who has brought it forward as on that of the parties more immediately interested in it. I should, therefore, have

carefully avoided expressing, at this time, any opinion at all upon the subject; but I trust the reader will be ready to acknowledge, that it was necessary to say thus much in answer to the malignant paragraph above quoted.

GERMAN TROOPS.—The reader will bear in mind, that after the Battle of Salamanca, an order was issued from the *Horse Guards*, stating, that, in consequence of the German Legion having frequently distinguished itself during the war in the Peninsula, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent had been pleased to direct, that the Officers of the corps of that Legion should HAVE PERMANENT RANK IN THE ENGLISH ARMY.—I observed at the time of issuing the order, that this, if I understood the meaning of the words, was not *lawful*, and that, to give effect to the Order, an act of Parliament must be passed.—Since the new Parliament assembled, a discussion has taken place upon this subject, in consequence of a motion of Lord Folkestone, who is entitled to the thanks of the nation for the watchfulness he has constantly shewn in regard to the employing of Foreign Troops in this kingdom.—Before I enter upon an account of the debate to which I now allude, it will be necessary, in order to a clear understanding of the matter, briefly to state *what the law is*.—First, then, the law, as contained in the act of Settlement, passed in the 12th and 13th of William the 3d, and which act, be it observed, expresses the conditions, upon which the House of Brunswick should succeed to the throne of England; the law, as laid down in that act, expressly says, that no Foreigner shall hold, under the Crown of these kingdoms, *any office, or place of trust, civil or military*. And, I beg the reader to observe, that this act is entitled, an act for further limiting the Crown, and better securing the rights and liberties of the people; so that, in order better to secure the rights and liberties of the people, it was thought necessary to prohibit the Crown from employing Foreigners as officers in the army, in case the House of Brunswick succeeded to the Throne.—Thus stood the law, when, in 1804, an act was passed to authorize the King to embody certain Foreigners into corps, and to employ them in his service. This was the act under which those troops called the German Legion were raised. It authorized the King to put the men thus raised under the command of *Foreign Officers*, and, of course,

it departed from the act of Settlement in this respect, because, it sanctioned the putting of Foreigners into places of *military trust* in this kingdom. I must observe here, too, that this was a *bill of indemnity*; for the King, or rather his ministers, had actually raised the corps and appointed the officers before the act was passed, and by the act the Parliament *indemnified them for having done so*! However, the act was passed, and it became legal for the King to give military trust to Foreigners as Officers in these particular corps; but, that the act extended no farther, that it did *not* authorize the King to give them military trust *any where else than in these corps*, is quite clear from the preamble of the bill itself, which states, that the King shall be authorized to give Foreigners places of military trust in these corps, **BECAUSE THEY UNDERSTAND THE LANGUAGE AND MANNERS OF THE MEN OF WHOM THE CORPS ARE TO BE COMPOSED.**

—Under the sanction of this act, however, or, at least, since this act was passed, Foreign Officers have been put upon the General staff; they have had commands given them in the districts of England; they have commanded at reviews in England: they have had the command in England in some cases, where even regiments of militia have been under them; and, lastly, they have held commissions in English regiments; though it would seem strange that they should have been thus employed, seeing, that, at any rate, they are not likely to understand the language and manners of our men better than our native officers!

—Still, however, there was one clause in the act of 1804, which it seemed impossible to get over; and that was, that the act should *cease to be in force at the end of the war*. Of course, when peace came, the commissions of these officers must all cease.

—This I was well aware of, and, therefore, I said that the Order from the Horse Guards, if I understood it rightly, was illegal.—Not so, the hireling writers of the London press. They applauded the Order, and the Courier news-paper in particular abused before-hand any one that should find fault with it, asserting, that any one who did, must be a friend of Buonaparté.—We now come to the debate in question, the whole of which, as published in the Courier news-paper of the 11th inst. I have inserted below, and every word of which I beg the reader to attend to, as being of the utmost importance to our liberties and our personal safety; aye,

of much greater importance to those liberties than are the events in Spain and Portugal, and, perhaps, even those in Russia and Poland.—Lord FOLKESTONE, as will be seen in the account of the debate, complained that the German officers were now to have *permanent rank*, and that they were shouldering out our own officers and taking the command of our own armies. Lord PALMERSTON, the Secretary at War, did not, it seems, think it proper to support the Order from the War-office, and explained it to mean, not that the German officers were to have *real rank* after the end of this war, as Lord Folkestone supposed, and as I supposed, and as Mr. Canning said he supposed, and as every body else supposed; but that the Order meant merely, that those officers should, after the war, have their *names printed in the army list according to the rank which they had borne before the end of the war*.—But, why was it not so expressed in the Order? Why did not the Order say this? The Order said no such thing; and, indeed, as far as words have a definite meaning, the Order said just the contrary. It said, “that those officers, now serving with TEMPORARY rank in the several *regiments of that “corps*, shall have PERMANENT rank in the *British army*.” What could this be understood to mean other than that these officers were to come in and take their turn in all promotion in our army, and to remain in it with the same security for the duration of their commissions as that possessed by our own officers?—Lord Palmerston says, however, that this *permanence* related merely to the insertion of their names in the army list, *after the war*. If this had been the case, the Order was perfect nonsense; for, as the reader may see, if he looks back into the army lists, their names have, for a long time past, been inserted in that list. But, what a gross absurdity will that list present; what an egregious piece of folly, if it should contain the names of these officers after the war? After the war, they will, as we have seen, be no longer officers in our service; their commissions die with the war; like many others, peace would be death to their occupation and their hopes; their corps would be disbanded, and they themselves stript of all authority here, and put back into their former state of officers in the army of the Elector of Hanover.—With what propriety, then, would their names appear in the *English* army list; in the list of an army to which they would no more belong than they would to the army

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of the American States? It appears to me to be something too absurd to be thought possible, that this scheme should have been in contemplation. No: something *more solid* was, I am fully convinced, intended; and, it having been discovered, that the boon could not be granted without an act of Parliament, it became prudent to give the matter up. If the Order had gone into effect agreeably to the plain English of it, it is very clear that it would have operated greatly to the injury of the officers of our own army. For instance, an English colonel might have had twenty or thirty of these German colonels put, at once over his head, if there were that number whose commissions were of a date prior to his, which would have been extremely injurious to him, and, upon the supposition of his having *purchased* his commission, not less unjust than injurious; seeing that, when he purchased, he could not have had in contemplation the introduction of these or any other foreigners.—The matter, however, has now been explained, and with that explanation I should have been satisfied for the present, if other matters, connected with it, had not been introduced. While the order was, in the debate, explained not to mean that the Germans were to have rank permanently in our army, great pains were taken to inculcate the opinion, that such a favour would not have been too great for their merits. The praises bestowed upon them were unbounded; one member appears to have been understood as giving them the *preference* to English officers; and Lord Palmerston, rather indiscreetly, as it turned out, called upon Lord Folkestone to look at the *GAZETTES*, if he wished to know *whether the Germans had, or had not, DISTINGUISHED themselves during the war.*—Lord Folkestone accepted the challenge, which was repeated by General Stewart. His Lordship said, “With respect to the “desire, or rather challenge, of the gallant Officer (Stewart) to *look to the gazettes*, in order to ascertain the achievements of the German Legion, he (Lord F.) had taken occasion to review those “gazettes, because a similar desire had “been the night before expressed to him “by others, and he was happy to find that “in glory, as it appeared from the losses, “*the British army was not inferior*, compared with those *highly-applauded*, those “*particularly-honoured Foreigners*. For “what was the comparison? Why, let “*the House and the Country* judge from a

“few instances.”—His Lordship then made the following comparative statement, a copy of which he has done me the honour to transmit to me.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

	Killed.	Wound.	Total
German Legion lost, on an average, per Battalion . . .	22	103	125
British regiments, on an average, lost	18	91	109

BATTLE ON THE DAY BEFORE.

German Legion—Six battalions of Infantry and one regiment of Cavalry	33	123	156
One English Battalion (2d Battalion, 87th Regiment) . . .	27	137	164

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

Germans—4 Battalions and 2 detachments	10	49	59
English—1 Battalion 45th Regt. . .	25	113	138
1 Battalion 88th Regt.	31	102	133

BATTLE OF BARROSA.

Germans—Not one either killed or wounded.

AFFAIR OF 3D MAY, 1811.

Germans—6 Battalions	3	20	23
English—1 Battalion 71st Regt. . .	8	38	46
1 Battalion 79th Regt.	5	19	24

AFFAIR OF 5TH MAY, 1811.

Germans—6 Battalions	3	48	51
English—1 Battalion 71st Regt. . .	13	74	87
1 Battalion 79th Regt.	27	135	162

SIEGE OF BADAJOS, FROM 5 TO 11 JUNE, 1811.

Germans—6 Battalions	1	2	3
English—1 Battalion 51st Regt. . .	26	78	104

ASSAULT OF CUIDAD RODRIGO.

English loss	130	496	626
German loss	0	0	0

CAPTURE OF BADAJOS, 1812.

English loss	668	2402	3070
German loss	0	0	0

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

Germans, 2 Battalions,	8	96	104
English, 2 Battalions of the 7th Regt.	125	557	682
1 Battalion, 48th Regt.	67	206	273
1 Battalion, 29th Regt.	80	245	325

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

(and observe, this was the battle, for the deeds performed at which, the order was issued)			
Germans, 5 Battalions,	9	87	96
English, 1 Battalion, (the 3rd of the 1st Foot,)	23	137	160

1 Battalion 7th Regt.	20	175	195
1 Battalion, 11th Regt.	45	296	341
1 Battalion, 38th Regt.	16	127	143
1 Battalion, 61st Regt.	44	322	366

148 1057 1205

5 other English Battalions, (being the 5 who suffered least in the engagement,) lost

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That is, (dividing these numbers by 10,) on an average } 14 106 121
per Battalion,

That is, for each *one* English Battalion, more than the *five* German Battalions put together.

Now, reader, English reader, when you have looked well at this, look once more at the ORDER in question, which said that, "In consideration of the King's German Legion having so frequently distinguished themselves against the enemy, during the campaign, but particularly at the battle of Salamanca, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to order that those Officers now serving with temporary rank in the several regiments of that corps, shall have permanent rank in the British army, from the dates of their respective Commissions." Here, then, are we all in a situation to judge. "Upon this review," added Lord Folkestone, "the Country may decide which description of force encountered more danger, suffered more loss, gained more glory, or was entitled to more praise. To some persons he knew it would be absurd to appeal. From those who paid more regard to their own will than to law or reason; from those who could originate an order apparently designed, and since it was issued he would undertake to say notoriously conceived, to involve a direct violation of law, he could not expect due attention. But he looked to the consideration of the Gentlemen of that House, who must feel, that whatever difference of opinion might prevail upon general questions, the explanation of this extraordinary order was calculated to do good."—A great deal of good, certainly, and for which the country is indebted to Lord Folkestone, who by this one act, has, in my opinion, rendered greater service to the country than would be rendered by the driving of the French out of Spain.—That the Order was generally understood as putting the Germans upon exactly the same footing as our own offi-

cers; that it was understood as giving them a permanent situation in our army, is very clear, and, indeed, General Stewart defended the Order in that sense of it. Lord Palmerston said, indeed, that the German Officers did not so understand it; and, in proof of the truth of his assertion, he said he had a letter to that effect from some German Baron, who is a General; but, upon a question being put to Lord Palmerston by Lord Folkestone, the former confessed that the said letter was written after the latter had given notice of his motion.

—Upon this occasion the old doctrines; that is to say, the doctrines of the last writer, were advanced in defence of employing these foreigners in England, and Mr. Ponsonby, the leader of the whigs, begged to be understood as not participating in the "vulgar prejudices" which were said to exist against employing these foreigners in England. Sir H. Mildmay is also reported as having disclaimed such prejudices. They were well answered by Lord Milton, who said, that he must protest against any foreigner whatever, being appointed to commands in England, and that he could make no exception in favour of *Hanoverians*, for that they were not, and never had been subjects of the King of England.—It was urged by Lord Palmerston and others, in defence of the employing of foreign troops, that Buonaparté did the same. This was urged once before, and it was once before observed in answer, that it ought to be shown, to make it a case in point, that Buonaparté employed foreign troops in France; that he gave them commissions in French regiments; that he gave them command of military districts in France; no part of which has ever been, and, in my opinion, ever can be, shown.

—Besides, must we do a thing, or think a thing right to be done, because he does the like? What would be said of me if I were to insist that we ought to abolish tithes, for instance, because tithes have been abolished in France? Nay, to come closer to the point, what was said, and what was attempted to be done, to the editor of the Independent Whig, because he found fault with our Government for not treating our soldiers in the same manner that Buonaparté treated his soldiers? This, supposing the cases to be perfectly similar, is no justification at all of the measure. But nothing can, in my opinion, be more dissimilar than the two cases, and the use of the argument only tends to shew how des-

titute the measure is of any solid ground of support.—There may be room for doubt as to whether the employing of foreign troops *abroad* be wise or not. That is a question which I shall be very willing to leave to the decision of those who are in expectation of being able to effect “*the deliverance of Europe.*” It is in England; it is here, in our own country, and amongst ourselves, that I disapprove of the employment of foreign troops, and I disapprove of it, upon the same principles and upon the same grounds that it was disapproved of by our forefathers. I would rather that they never should be where an English army is; but, the object of my rooted antipathy is their being in *England*.—It does seem too, rather singular, that we should stand in need of these Hanoverians to assist us in a war in Spain and Portugal, where, as we are told, all the people hate our enemies and love us. Why, if this be true, should we go to Germany, and pay large bounties for troops to assist us? Surely, we might raise troops enough in Spain, full as zealous for the liberties of that country, as the German Legion is likely to be. In short, as I never have seen, so I cannot now see any good reason for the employment of these troops, and I am fully convinced, that the day is not distant when the public will be unanimously of my opinion.—At the time when the famous *Order* was issued, the *Courier* asserted, that there was but ONE MAN in England who would object to it, in the sense that it was then understood.—The hireling is now *silent*.

PAPER AGAINST GOLD.—The discussions upon this subject have been revived; but, interesting as the matter is, I must put off my observations upon it till next week.

WM. COBBETT.

Bolley, 17th Dec. 1812.

GERMAN TROOPS.

Debate, in the House of Commons, on the 10th of Dec. 1812, on the Motion of Lord Viscount Folkestone, relative to the German Troops.

Lord Folkestone rose to call the attention of the House, in consequence of his notice, to a subject of much importance, which he should have felt it his duty to do on an earlier day, had he not been applied to by a Noble Lord opposite to postpone it. If his motion for papers were now objected to, he should lose by the delay, in the event of a di-

vision, since many members were necessarily absent. He hoped the delay was not asked for the purpose of gaining a greater majority. He intended to make several motions for papers on the subject. He had last Session called their attention to an infraction of the law by the employment of foreign officers in the British army, and a return was then ordered, which, though regular in its form, was still imperfect, it being drawn for the return of foreign officers employed on home service; and therefore the fair account was not rendered, which should have included those on foreign service. No adequate idea was hence given of the number of foreigners in our service. One motion he should make should therefore be, for the return of the whole number; another for that of foreigners on the staff; and another for that of the officers of the 60th regiment of foot, who have staff appointments, which was forbidden by law. He then referred to the order of August last, in the *Gazette*, as to German officers, which stated, that in consideration of their services, particularly at the battle of Salamanca, they should receive, instead of temporary, permanent rank in the British army. There appeared to his Lordship only one way of understanding this: and which was, that it was an attempt to introduce permanently and for ever into our army, these officers, who were, under an Act of Parliament, serving only in a temporary way, till one year after the conclusion of the war. But he understood that another construction was put on it, and that his own was an erroneous one. Might he then ask of the Noble Lord or any Right Hon. Gentleman opposite, in order to save the time of the House, whether he was right in his interpretation, or if not, what was the real meaning of the order? If he misunderstood it, he might waste time needlessly in arguing upon it.

Lord Palmerston hardly knew how to answer the question.

Lord Folkestone stated, that it appeared to be an attempt to foist the Foreign Officers into permanent rank in our army, to render them not liable to removal at peace, and to give them all the advantages of half-pay, &c. in future on our establishment.

Lord Palmerston said, that the effect of the order was not to give to Foreign Officers any advantages or privileges inconsistent with the Act under which they were serving.

Lord Folkestone said, if the words of the Order were to be construed according to the common understanding of the English Language, they certainly did imply, that privileges were conferred upon the Officers of the German Legion, which were, to all intents and purposes, inconsistent with the terms of the Act of Parliament. The great exploits of the corps are made the cause for conferring on them some great boon. But according to the Noble Lord, this great reward which was purported in the order was not given them. In former times, when British Officers went into the army in the temporary rank of superior Officers, without having gone through the inferior steps, it was not usual for these Officers to get promotion. But now, the German Officers, who are only temporary, are to be introduced into our service, are to be promoted, and to shoulder out our old General Officers, who have risen progressively to their rank.—(*Hear! hear!*)—The Order should have said “permanent rank in the German Legion,” and not in the British Army. The Order, according to the explanation of a Noble Lord, was a mark of absurdity in the Office from which it was issued—of want of knowledge of the English language, and had the effect of deceiving the Officers of the German Legion, besides causing much uneasiness in the British Army. The object of his motion, therefore, would be, to procure information, by which the Officers of the British Army might understand that they had not received that injury, which, in the present state of their knowledge, they could not fail to suppose that they had suffered. His Lordship concluded by moving, “That an humble Address be presented to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, praying, that His Royal Highness would be pleased to order, that there should be laid before the House, Copies of all the Orders which had been issued from the Horse Guards, relative to the rank of the Officers in the King’s German Legion.”

Lord Palmerston observed, that the short answer he had given had induced the Noble Lord to alter his whole line of argument. Had he made an explanation earlier, it might have prevented this question altogether. It was a mere difference as to the interpretation of words, and the whole nature of the misconception might be sufficiently explained. Temporary, and permanent, were different terms, and the terms that were used in the services,

which differed certainly in various respects. Permanent rank meant the common ordinary rank and promotion of the army. Temporary rank signified an exception, and was generally given to those who raised men for rank, and for other reasons, which occasioned the granting them high commissions. Temporary rank also was confined to particular corps and services, but did not give full *brevet* promotion with the rest of the army, nor did it confer half-pay. But the House should be aware, that it never was in the contemplation of the framers of the Order, or of those to whom it was addressed, that it was to be construed otherwise than in conjunction with the Act by which these corps were sanctioned. Many of our foreign corps were in fact brought into service, complete established corps. The Germans were not so, but they had been previously in the Hanoverian service; and it was found necessary on their coming here to combine them, and to preserve the previous rank held by their Officers. But the analogy of our service had been preserved; the first Officers had only temporary rank: but the whole of the corps were not serving with temporary rank. In all the foreign corps, the Officers, who since the commencement of the corps have been appointed Ensigns and Cornets, had been so appointed and promoted, without any distinction from other Officers of the British Army in general. The Order, in fact, did not apply to all the German Officers, but only to those of the higher ranks, who had entitled themselves to favour and reward. But all those Officers were serving under a law which declared a limit to their services; and the order could not be meant to operate in defiance of the law. The Act authorized the granting of Commissions and Letters of Service; but did not say that these were to be different from those of British Officers. To have done otherwise would have been injurious to the service. It was, he conceived, clear, that when the operation of the law ceased, the commissions must fall to the ground with that Act in which they originated. The Officers could not be entitled to half-pay, for the law forbade that. The advantage they received by the Order was, that when the Act ceased, their rank having been ordinary and permanent, their names would be printed in the Army List in their respective ranks, and they would have their honours and titles remaining. Thus their permanent rank did not violate the law, nor



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affect the interest of British Officers. Permanent rank had the advantage over the temporary in the general army promotion. The Act for the German Legion authorized the making of the articles of war, one of which directed that when serving with other corps, the senior Officer of either was to command, as was usual in the army in general. The Officers of the Legion, in regard of rank, had always been put in *brevet* as permanent. So far from this order enabling them to shoulder British Officers from their promotion, it gave them in practice no advantage whatever, either in rank or precedence which they had not before enjoyed. It might then naturally be asked, why an order was issued which in its effect appeared a nullity? It was because the Commander in Chief thought it was but paying a well-deserved compliment to a meritorious body of men, who had signalized themselves not only in one action, but throughout the whole campaign. It was a compliment which he was convinced would be gratifying to the feelings of many of the Officers of that corps, that they should retain, after peace, the military rank and titles which they might acquire by their honourable services in the course of the war. He knew that many had an objection to employing foreign soldiers on constitutional principles. He thought, however, that those who considered the circumstances of the times, as well as the Constitution of the country would not object to their being employed at present. If any man would look at the map of Europe, and see what a portion of its population the enemy had forced into hostility against this country,—if he were also to consider the limited population of these two islands, and the extensive colonies we have to defend, and the navy we have to support, it appeared to him hardly possible that such a man would now adhere to the idea of not employing foreigners in our service. Surely it would not be said, that the individuals now alluded to were objects of censure or distrust. He would beg the House to consider, who were they? They were not adventurers intruding themselves into the service of the country, but they were Germans—the natural subjects of our own Sovereign, who preferred an honourable exile to an ignominious servitude; and who were bound by allegiance to the same Sovereign who rules in this country. As to the value of their services, it would be seen from the perusal of the different Gazettes which were pub-

lished in the course of the summer. There was no action in which part of this gallant corps was not foremost in every danger. It did not appear to him that the Noble Lord had laid before the House sufficient grounds for the production of papers; but, he thought it would not be sufficient for the House barely to reject the motion on this ground. He thought the House should not allow itself to be supposed to concur in the idea of its being illegal and unconstitutional to employ foreign troops, and that it would be well that the new Parliament should have its opinion some way understood of the legality and propriety of continuing the present system of employing every means of carrying on offensive warfare which presented itself in the present circumstances.

Mr. Ponsonby objected particularly to the last part of the Noble Lord's speech. He hoped that the House would not on the present, or any other occasion, express an opinion on a subject not connected with the motion that was before them. The Noble Lord (Lord Folkestone) had not said a single word about this general question of employing foreigners, nor about the merits of this particular corps; and, therefore, if the House were to give an opinion upon those questions, it would be upon subjects not before them. He was extremely glad that the Noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) had given the explanation he had done; and the matter having been so explained, he now saw nothing illegal or unconstitutional in it. It seemed that the order was only intended as a compliment to the German Legion; but the Noble Lord (Folkestone) had certainly understood the order in the same way that he, and, as he believed, the public also had understood it. It appeared now, that in the language of the War Office, the word *permanent* meant *temporary*. If the Noble Lord (Lord P.) however, had been assured, that on account of his services, the place he held should be a permanent one, he supposed that he would think it hard, if, at the end of the year, or at the conclusion of the war, he should be removed, and told that permanent and temporary meant the same things. If the officers to whom this order applied, were really highly gratified and pleased with it under the explanation now given, he must say, that they must be as disinterested a set of soldiers as ever lived. He was certainly aware that the word permanent could not be strictly applied to any portion of our

army, which existed from year to year by the annual Mutiny Act; and if there was no intention of giving those foreign officers command in our army longer than the period under which they had been engaged by the sanction of Parliament, he saw no objection to the measure. He had heard that there were many persons who entertained an aversion to foreign troops, and a hostile feeling to those Germans; he wished particularly to state that he had no such feelings. (*Hear, hear.*) He had heard from many officers of high rank, that some corps had very highly distinguished themselves against the enemy, and he felt neither aversion nor distrust towards them. Nevertheless he adhered to the opinion, that Parliament ought generally to look with a constitutional jealousy to the employment of foreign soldiers, especially within this realm.

Sir H. Mildmay said, that he should vote for the motion. He had no objection to this corps as Germans, but he objected merely to the manner in which they were employed.

Lord Milton believed, that in point of fact, German officers had in this country commanded districts, and British regiments; and he particularly alluded to Baron Linsingen. Now he thought this was not a proper employment for Foreign Officers. He had no objection to their being employed in commands abroad, but he did not like to see them in command in this country, except in their particular corps. In this distinction he conceived himself founded on the true principles of the constitution.

Lord Palmerston said, in explanation, that with the Officers of the German Legion from its first foundation, their temporary rank gave them corresponding command. In the case of Baron Linsingen, the command of the district would have naturally devolved upon him, on the removal of Lord Chatham; but the fact, as he believed, was, that the Baron never had commanded a district, as an older English Officer was immediately appointed to it: he had only commanded at the depot.

Lord Milton repeated his persuasion, that the Baron had for some time actually commanded the Eastern district.

General Stewart could not, as a military man who had seen the services of those corps, remain silent upon the present occasion. He would ask the Noble Lord (*Lord Milton*) why, when they were in-

trusted with commands against the enemy, they should not be equally trusted in this country? *Lord Wellington* had intrusted the command of the light division, which was one of the finest in the whole army, to Baron Alten. Notwithstanding the partiality he naturally felt for English troops, yet the Germans had so eminently distinguished themselves in the Peninsula, that he was sure, if it was put to the whole army to say, whether they ought not to have permanent rank, there would not be a dissentient voice. When he first read the Order, he certainly did understand it in the sense which the Noble Lord (*Lord Folkestone*) did, (*loud cries of hear, hear*), and in that he would approve of it. He had witnessed the merits of the German troops in the Peninsula. The 1st regiment of Hussars was the admiration of the whole army; and in the department of Quarter-Master-General, he knew some German Officers, who, he thought, ought to be preferred to British Officers. Besides great clearness and diligence, many of them possessed advantages acquired before the war in the Peninsula.

Lord Milton begged to be allowed to say in explanation, and in answer to the Gallant General who could not apprehend why, if it were allowable to intrust commands to German Officers abroad, it should not be considered allowable to intrust to them commands at home, that the very reason was, that in the one case the command was in Portugal, and in the other in England.

Mr. Canning confessed that his mind was inexpressibly relieved by the explanation which the Noble Secretary at War had given of an order, which, until that hour he certainly understood, in common with the Right Honourable Gentleman opposite, in common with the Public, and, as it now appeared, in common even with one of the gallant leaders of that army with which the German Legion was immediately connected, to import no less than the communication of permanent rank to the Officers of that Legion, in the sense in which that term was usually interpreted in the British army. His mind was inexpressibly relieved by that explanation, because it proved, that in fact, the Law and the Constitution had not been violated. It gave him great satisfaction to learn, that the order in question was not so ineffective as the Noble Lord had described it to be, for whatever might be his sense of the merit of the troops to which it referred, no

earthly consideration could have induced him, as a member of that House, acting upon constitutional principles, to have lent his sanction to such a measure, had it possessed the character which he and the country had erroneously attributed to it. To all that had been said of the services of the brave German troops he most heartily subscribed; and if any question had arisen with respect to their merits, the House must feel that the gallant and generous testimony just borne to those merits by a kindred spirit, would have been conclusive on the subject. (*Hear!*) But it was no disparagement to the gallant General who had spoken so much to their credit and his own, to say, that while that Hon. Officer looked at the question with a military eye, it became the House to consider it with a view to its bearing on the Constitution. While he cordially concurred in all that had been said, and in all that could be added in praise of the German troops, he could not let his feelings, or the consideration of the existing crisis, so far overpower his duty to his country as to forget (as he thought the Noble Secretary at War seemed at one time to forget) that it was necessity alone that justified their employment. Although no man, rationally considering the circumstances of the times, could object to their employment, yet it ought always to be remembered, that to employ them was the exception and not the rule. Looking, therefore, at the Order as it had been generally understood—as it had been understood by the public as well as by himself—an understanding, he must observe, mainly supported by the comments with which it was accompanied at the time the Order was issued in publications, which, though certainly not authorized, were widely circulated—an understanding, of which the report of that night's debate would convey to the country the first contradiction—he must say, that it would have involved a principle from which it would have been imperative on him utterly to dissent. In the best and earliest times of our renovated Constitution—in the reign of that hero to whom we were indebted for that Constitution—in the case of the very troops which had been called in to secure the establishment of that Constitution—in the case of the Dutch troops in the service of King William, although that great sovereign and benefactor of the country descended almost to supplicate the House of Commons to allow him to retain his own guards, they would not

permit it as soon as the necessity for their presence ceased to exist; not with an unwise and unprecedented zeal, but in the spirit that had thus grown up with the Constitution itself, it would have behoved every man in that House to look at the Order in question, had its purport been such, as until that night it had universally been supposed to be. Although he was not in the habit of paying the Noble Lord who made the motion many compliments, he could by no means indulge in any sneer against him, for having brought under the consideration of Parliament a document so enigmatical, as even to deceive the companion in arms of those to whom it related. On the contrary, he thought the Noble Lord was in the present instance entitled to the gratitude of the House and the country, for having produced the explanation which had been afforded by the Noble Secretary at War, and for having put him (Mr. Canning) in a situation which permitted him, instead of supporting the Noble Lord's motion, to pay him a compliment, and vote against it.

Lord *Folkestone* made a short reply to the various arguments that had been adduced against his motion. He expressed his astonishment that any Honourable Member should come down and eulogise the German troops, holding them up as superior to British troops.

General *Stewart* spoke to order, denying that he had characterized the German as superior to the British troops. On the contrary, he had avowed his partiality of the British troops, and particularly British cavalry; instancing, at the same time, a regiment of German cavalry, which had nobly distinguished itself.

Lord *Folkestone* continued. He understood him distinctly to have spoken of other military departments also, in which he had given the preference to the Germans. He would contend, in opposition to what had fallen from the Secretary at War, that Baron *Linsingen* had actually for some period commanded the Eastern District, and ordered out the militia regiments at Ipswich. This was contrary to the express words of the Act of Parliament, which, in sanctioning the employment of those Foreign Officers, expressly stated that they were only to be allowed commands in their own particular corps, "inasmuch as they could best drill them, from being acquainted with their language and manners." He should also state, that in the teeth of an Act of Parliament, part of the 60th regiment, raised only for

service in America, was sent to the Peninsula. No man would object to such employment of them, if Ministers, instead of breaking an Act of Parliament, would come to Parliament and point out the necessity of such a change of destination. Upon occasions of this nature, there was something else to be consulted besides the map of Europe. He thought it as necessary to consult the Constitution and the Act of Settlement. Not only at the Revolution did our ancestors refuse to allow Dutch troops to stay in this country, but on the accession of the House of Hanover, there was an Act, the very last year, which had directly in its contemplation the employment of Hanoverian troops. It was against this very description of foe, that our ancestors shewed a constitutional jealousy at the time of passing the Act of Settlement. The Noble Lord then made a statement of the losses of the German corps in the different great actions in the Peninsula, which he thought would give a fair criterion to judge whether they signalled themselves more than British troops. At the battle of Talavera, the German battalions had certainly suffered more loss, upon an average, than the British, but in every other action the balance was the other way. At Barrosa, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajos, no Germans were engaged; and at Busaco their loss was very trifling indeed. He then stated the amount of the German loss in the different actions, and compared it with the loss of some British battalions, which was much more severe. This mode of comparison, he allowed, might be considered unfair, if a positive superiority had not been claimed on the part of the Germans. Lord Folkestone concluded with observing, that if the Noble Lord's explanation proved satisfactory to the public, he should be content in the reflection, that no inconsiderable portion of the object he had in view was accomplished.

Lord Palmerston, in explanation, contended, that he had not expressed any contempt of the Act of Settlement. The command was temporary, and was founded on the Article of War, applicable to the German Legion, by which these Officers took precedence. He also saw nothing inconsistent or unconstitutional in the assumption of the command of a district by General Linsingen, as it must have devolved upon him in the absence of Lord Chatham, and was perfectly agreeable to the Article of War to which he had alluded. The Noble Lord appeared to have totally mistaken the nature of the reference to the Gazettes; for

the proper, and in fact, the only way to make the reference was, to establish a fair estimate by the comparison of numbers, as equal as possible, between certain proportions or corps of the British army and the German Legion.

Lord Folkestone maintained that he had founded his estimate upon that very comparison which he was charged with not having made.

Mr. Whitbread paid a compliment to the generous and liberal sentiments expressed by a gallant General (Stewart) on the eminent services and distinguished bravery of the German troops employed in Spain.—The mutual enthusiasm and unlimited confidence excited in the Officers of the army, by the exploits of others serving with them, ought however to increase, instead of lessening the jealousy with which we ought to guard against the incorporation of foreign troops with our own. This was not a military question, nor one in which we were to appeal to the sentiments of the army. It was a constitutional question, on which the Members of that House were to decide, as the guardians of the rights and civil liberties of the country. What he had risen for, was to direct the attention of the House to a circumstance which had not been noticed, the affectation which so generally and ridiculously prevailed, of imitating the dress of foreign soldiers. From the known predilection for this dress in a certain quarter, our troops were so Germanised or Frenchified in their appearance, that the most serious consequences were to be apprehended. In fact, English soldiers had fallen, and English Officers been taken prisoners in consequence of mistaking a corps of French troops for our own, and in the retreat from Salamanca, one of our Officers was near being killed by order of a brother Officer, who supposed him to be French. Notwithstanding the general sense entertained on this subject by the army, either remonstrances had not reached the source from which the remedy must spring, or had been ineffectual, so far had taste prevailed over judgment. Whatever might be our admiration of foreign troops employed with our own, there was surely no need to confound the two services together, each might retain a distinct, uniform, and independent character of its own. He could not abstain from expressing his concern at the conclusion of the speech of an Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Canning,) who after the strongest and most pointed arguments in favour of the propriety of the motion, expressed in lan-

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guage which only that Gentleman could command, had declared his intention of voting against it. This conduct of the Hon. Gentleman was, however, nothing new: he had been a good deal in the habits of speaking on one side of the question, and giving his vote on the other; nor could he, ever after to night, think himself entitled to calculate upon his support in a division, from the arguments he might use in the course of the debate.

Lord *Palmerston*, in answer to an inquiry from Lord *Folkestone*, on what authority he had stated that the Officers of the German Legion understood the order relating to their receiving permanent rank only in a qualified sense, said it was from a letter from General *Dekin*, who had expressed himself distinctly to that effect.

Lord *Folkestone*, wishing to know the date of that letter, Lord *Palmerston* replied, that it was subsequent to the notice of his Lordship's motion.

The motion was then negatived without a division.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Report of Monsieur the Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr to His Highness the Prince Major-General.

(Continued from page 766.)

columns before the front of the 6th division, commanded by M. General *Legrand*. He principally directed his attack against a battery which was not completed, on the left bank of the *Polota*, and which thus became the centre of the division of *Legrand*. Three or four times he endeavoured to obtain possession of it, and was always repulsed with that loss which is ever experienced when such enterprises cannot succeed. Up to the afternoon the enemy had not dared to attack the front of the right bank of the *Polota*, some points of which were tolerably well intrenched and finished; but about four o'clock they debouched from the road of *Seibit* and *Riga*, and furiously and in a crowd marched upon the left flank of the town, supported by the column which debouched from the *Naval* road.—I wished to have allowed all that fine ardour to be spent upon two redoubts, constructed and occupied by the *Bavarian* artillery and troops, and necessary to their defence, commanded by General *Vicente*; but the success of the 2d division, commanded by General *Merle*, as well as the 3d regiment of *Croates*, in opposition to their settled dispositions,

precipitated themselves before the *Russians*, and fought that fury with remarkable bravery, order, and *sang froid*. We, at least, brought the *Russians*, who made this attack under the walls of the town, where the carnage we caused them, from the morning, upon all points of their whole army, only terminated with night. The *Russians*, notwithstanding their superiority, left the ground heaped with corpses, and did not succeed in any of their attacks. —Notwithstanding the success obtained on this day, I was uneasy in the evening respecting the success my cavalry might have met with upon the left bank of the *Dwina*. On this day, I had deprived myself of the greater part of my cavalry, to be easy respecting my rear. In the evening, General *Carbineau*, whose brigade of horse, extremely fatigued, had not penetrated beyond the *Orschatz*, and had met, according to his account, with some cavalry and a few infantry; as he was perfectly satisfied in this respect, having, at his disposition three battalions of *Bavarian* infantry, I waited the following day with much tranquillity.—On the 19th, at break of day, we saw the enemy in movement upon the line, occupied in rectifying their position, and forming a half circle round ours. About ten in the morning, an *Aid-de-Camp* of General *Carbineau* arrived, and informed me he had before his brigade 5,000 men, and 12 squadrons of cavalry. I lost not a moment in taking a regiment out of each of the three divisions of the 2d corps, taking in preference those which might be most easily withdrawn from before the enemy, who would not then have failed to renew his attacks, and only waited to do it, the appearance of this corps, the arrival of which he impatiently expected. Towards noon, these troops defiled upon the heights behind *Polotsk*. The enemy clearly perceived the object of this movement; but thought it was a kind of reserve behind *Polotsk*. I assembled these troops, under the command of General *Amev*. I joined to them the 7th regiment of cuirasseurs, of *Denmir's* division, who had not hitherto met the enemy in proceeding up the *Dwina*. At the same time I ordered, that as soon as it was dusk, the whole of the army should cross to the left of the *Dwina*. Towards the fall of day, at the moment in which we began to withdraw the artillery from the advanced works, some imprudent persons set fire to General *Legrand's* barracks, which, in a moment, communicated

through the whole line, and gave the enemy certain proof that we were retiring. Then he began to fire from all his batteries, and threw into the town a quantity of shells and other incendiary projectiles, to set it on fire, in which he in part succeeded, hoping by this to prevent our artillery movements, and blow up our caissons.—This cannonade and bombardment were supported by a general attack. We saw each other as if in full day-light, by the light of the burning town; and this attack did not cease until the moment when the last man had repassed to the left bank of the Dwina; but, in the midst of these attacks, and the confusion caused by firing the town, the troops conducted themselves with the most extraordinary bravery, and the retreat was performed in the best order. At midnight all the artillery was retired, and the whole body of the troops had passed over at half-past two o'clock in the morning. I immediately reinforced with two regiments, which were the first that passed the troops, which I had put under the orders of General Amey, and who had succeeded, in the evening, in confining the enemy in the defiles near to Solouk, but were not yet in sight of M. De Wittgenstein's army. With these troops, there was a column of Bavarians, about 6 or 700 men strong. I re-united the whole under the command of M. Merle, to whom I gave orders to march immediately against the front of General Steingel, and to repulse him with vigour, and to throw him past the Orschatz, as I could then support this attack with another part of the army, if it should become necessary. At the moment that these troops put themselves in motion, they fell in with those of the enemy.—The corps of M. de Steingel was broken, and after a great loss in killed, driven to the other side of the Polota, leaving in our hands 12 or 1,500 prisoners, among whom were 18 Officers of different ranks; and among others, a Captain of an English vessel, employed in the Etat-Major of M. Steingel, and who said he had been three weeks in the Russian service. This affair gives great honour to M. Count Wrengel, who directed it, and to General Amey, who seconded him well.—I owe the greatest eulogiums to the good conduct of the troops, to the zeal and intelligence of Officers of all ranks, and of the whole army, who have seconded me well; among whom I shall mention Messrs. the Generals Legrand, Merle, Baron, Laurencez; my Chief of the General Staff,

Aubrey, Commander of the Artillery of the 2d corps; Desde, Commander of the Engineers; and M. the Adjutant Commandant Dalbignac, who have on this day acquired new rights on His Majesty's favour. I shall have the honour to address to your Highness, in a few days from this place, a list of the Officers who, by their good conduct, have merited preferment.—Our loss is not very considerable in comparison with that of the enemy, which is enormous. General Legrand has had a horse killed under him, and received two contusions. General Guicheew, Aid-de-Camp to His Majesty, is among the number of the wounded.—I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that a ball which I have received in my left foot, and which hinders me from marching, or mounting on horseback, will oblige me to quit the command of the corps d'armée, for ten or twelve days. I have given it up to General Legrand. I reckon upon remaining at only one march from the corps d'armée, to be ready to resume my functions, hoping to be still useful to the corps d'armée by my counsels, if Gen. Legrand approve them. But I expect in a few days the Duke of Reggio, and the 9th corps under the command of the Duke of Belluno, is in march. Our junction effected, we will briskly push the Russian army.

(Signed) The Marshal-Gen. St. Cyr.

LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

Wednesday, Dec. 16.

Foreign-Office, Dec. 16.

Dispatches, of which the following are copies, were received last night by Viscount Castlereagh, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, from General Viscount Cathcart, K. T. His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Russia, dated at St. Petersburg, 23d and 25th November, 1812.

St. Petersburg, Nov. 23, 1812.

My Lord,—In my dispatch of the 15th instant, I had the honour to detail such operations of Marshal Kutosoff's army as had come to my knowledge up to the 9th of November; since that date no report has been received of the further proceedings of the corps intrusted to General Platoff. The Field-Marshal had calculated to reach Krasnoi on the 14th instant, but although he had approached within a few

wersts of that place, I have not heard that his head-quarters were established there on the 16th. His last dispatch of the latter date announces his intention of forwarding a Journal of the preceding days, which will contain important relations, but it has not as yet been received. On the 9th of November, Count Orloff Denizoff, being advanced on the roads towards Smolensko and Krasnoi, received intelligence of the march of a French corps from Smolensko, in the direction of Kalouga, composed of fresh troops intended for the different regiments of guards; this force was under the command of General Barragé D'Hillier, having with him General Charpentier and Brigadier-General Augereau, brother to the Marshal of that name. They were distributed in the three villages of Yasvin, Lakoff, and Dolgomust. A disposition of attack was immediately made by three partisan corps, commanded by Captain Slavina, Colonel Davidoff, and Captain Phigner. The result was, that the corps under Charpentier was nearly cut to pieces, that Barragé D'Hillier having patiently heard a cannonade for several hours in the quarters of Augereau's division, made good his retreat to Smolensko, and that Augereau's corps of 3,000 men, after losing nearly one-third of their number, laid down their arms, and capitulated to Captain Phigner, who had not 1,500 men, and who appears to have conducted this affair with infinite address and gallantry.—In this corps were two squadrons of cavalry, well mounted. The prisoners amounted to one General, sixty Staff and other Officers, and two thousand rank and file. The Officers who capitulated stated the object of their march, by that route, was to open another communication in the direction of Kalouga; they were not aware of the retreat of the army.—Since this affair, three General Officers, upwards of twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand prisoners have been taken near Smolensko, but the particulars are not yet reported.—On the 14th instant, General Count Wittgenstein was attacked by Marshal Victor, who had orders to drive him to the other side of the Dwina. The enemy was repulsed, with the loss of two to three thousand men, and was pursued the next morning in his retreat towards Senno, when six hundred prisoners were taken. I have the honour to enclose a copy of Major-General Baron Dornberg's report of this affair.—Nothing material occurred at this post till the 18th, when Count Wittgenstein was join-

ed by Colonel Chernichef, Aid-de-Camp to His Imperial Majesty, who had been detached by Admiral Tchichagoff, with a small corps of light cavalry, to discover and ascertain General Count Wittgenstein's position.—In the course of this expedition, the Colonel had the good fortune to rescue Major-General Baron Winzengerode and his Aid-de-Camp, Captain Narishkin, between Vilna and Minsk; they were proceeding towards the frontier, under an escort of gens-d'armes, and had been marched from Verrea, where they were presented to Buonaparté, with the French guards under the charge of Junot.—Colonel Chernichef also took three couriers, one coming from, and the other two going to Paris.—From these sources of intelligence it is ascertained, that Buonaparté was at Smolensko on the 13th instant.—Admiral Tchichagoff intended, according to his route, to arrive at Minsk on the 17th instant.—Colonel Chernichef arrived at the palace yesterday, accompanied by the prisoners he has released, and bringing with him the intercepted dispatches. Those from Paris contain nothing but military plans and maps.—The expedition of Colonel Chernichef was a continued and extraordinary exertion, he having marched seven hundred wersts in five days, and swam across several rivers.—It is stated, but no official report has been received, that General Sacken has been left with a detachment to observe Prince Schwartzberg, and that General Eartel has advanced to and occupied Mohiloff.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CATHCART.

Jamich, Nov. 15, 1812.

My Lord,—I am very happy to inform your Lordship, that Victor has failed in fulfilling the orders he received from Buonaparté, to drive Count Wittgenstein behind the Dwina. He attacked yesterday morning. Count Wittgenstein ordered the advanced guard to retire to the Position. This was executed in a masterly manner: they retired in echiquier, under a very heavy fire, as if it was a field day. In the Position the French were received by a well-directed fire from the artillery, by which they must have lost a great number in killed and wounded, I suppose between two and three thousand. The firing only ceased about seven in the evening. The French had made strong de-

(*To be continued.*)

ENGLISH LIBERTY OF THE PRESS,

As illustrated in the Prosecution and Punishment of

WILLIAM COBBETT.

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IN order that my countrymen and that the world may not be deceived, duped, and cheated upon this subject, I, **WILLIAM COBBETT**, of Botley, in Hampshire, put upon record the following facts; to wit: That, on the 24th June, 1809, the following article was published in a London news-paper, called the **COURIER**:—"The Mutiny amongst the **LO-CAL MILITIA**, which broke out at Ely, was "fortunately suppressed on Wednesday by the "arrival of four squadrons of the **GERMAN "LEGION CAVALRY** from Bury, under the "command of General Auckland. Five of the "ringleaders were tried by a Court-Martial, and "sentenced to receive 500 lashes each, part of which "punishment they received on Wednesday, and "a part was remitted. A stoppage for their knap-sacks was the ground of the complaint that ex-cited this mutinous spirit, which occasioned "the men to surround their officers, and demand "what they deemed their arrears. The first "division of the German Legion halted yesterday "at Newmarket on their return to Bury."—That, on the 1st July, 1809, I published, in the **Political Register**, an article censuring, in the strongest terms, these proceedings; that, for so doing, the Attorney General prosecuted, as seditious libellers, and by **Ex-Officio** Information, me, and also my printer, my publisher, and one of the principal retailers of the **Political Register**; that I was brought to trial on the 15th June, 1810, and was, by a Special Jury, that is to say, by 12 men out of 48 appointed by the Master of the Crown Office, found guilty; that, on the 20th of the same month, I was compelled to give bail for my appearance to receive judgment; and that, as I came up from Botley (to which place I had returned to my family and my farm on the evening of the 15th), a Tipstaff went down from London in order to seize me, personally; that, on the 9th of July, 1810, I, together with my printer, publisher, and the news-man, were brought into the Court of King's Bench to receive judgment; that the three former were sentenced to be imprisoned for some months in the King's Bench prison; that I was sentenced to be imprisoned for two years in Newgate, the great receptacle for malefactors, and the front of which is the scene of numerous hangings in the course of every year; that the part of the prison in which I was sentenced to be confined is sometimes inhabited by felons, that felons were actually in it at the time I entered it; that one man was taken out of it to be transported in about 48 hours after I was put into the same yard with him; and that it is the place of confinement for men guilty of unnatural crimes, of whom there are four in it at this time; that, besides this imprisonment, I was sentenced to pay a thousand pounds **TO THE KING**, and to give security for my good behaviour for seven years, myself in the sum of 3,000 pounds, and

two sureties in the sum of 1,000 pounds each; that the whole of this sentence has been executed upon me, that I have been imprisoned the two years, have paid the thousand pounds **TO THE KING**, and have given the bail, Timothy Brown and Peter Walker, Esqrs. being my sureties; that the Attorney General was Sir Vicary Gibbs, the Judge who sat at the trial Lord Ellenborough, the four Judges who sat at passing sentence Ellenborough, Grose, Le Blanc, and Bailey; and that the jurors were, Thomas Rhodes of Hampstead Road, John Davis of Southampton Place, James Ellis of Tottenham Court Road, John Richards of Bayswater, Thomas Marsham of Baker Street, Robert Heathcote of High Street Marylebone, John Maud of York Place Marylebone, George Bagster of Church Terrace Pancras, Thomas Taylor of Red Lion Square, David Deane of St. John Street, William Palmer of Upper Street Islington, Henry Favre of Pall Mall; that the Prime Ministers during the time were Spencer Perceval, until he was shot by John Bellingham, and after that Robert B. Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool; that the prosecution and sentence took place in the reign of King George the Third, and that, he having become insane during my imprisonment, the 1,000 pounds was paid to his son, the Prince Regent, in his behalf; that, during my imprisonment, I wrote and published 364 Essays and Letters upon political subjects; that, during the same time, I was visited by persons from 197 cities and towns, many of them as a sort of deputies from Societies or Clubs; that, at the expiration of my imprisonment, on the 9th of July, 1812, a great dinner was given in London for the purpose of receiving me, at which dinner upwards of 600 persons were present, and at which Sir Francis Burdett presided; that dinners and other parties were held on the same occasion in many other places in England; that, on my way home, I was received at Alton, the first town in Hampshire, with the ringing of the Church bells; that a respectable company met me and gave me a dinner at Winchester; that I was drawn from more than the distance of a mile into Botley by the people; that, upon my arrival in the village, I found all the people assembled to receive me; that I concluded the day by explaining to them the cause of my imprisonment, and by giving them clear notions respecting the flogging of the Local Militia-men at Ely, and respecting the employment of German Troops; and, finally, which is more than a compensation for my losses and all my sufferings, I am in perfect health and strength, and, though I must, for the sake of six children, feel the diminution that has been made in my property (thinking it right in me to decline the offer of a subscription), I have the consolation to see growing up three sons, upon whose hearts, I trust, all these facts will be engraven.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, July 23, 1812.

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